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FAITH AND THE FIRM 
MATTHEW T. BODIE* 
In his Childress Lecture essay, Professor Larry Sager addresses the clash 
between public accommodation laws and legal protections for the free exercise 
of religion.1 In particular, Sager keys in on the post-Obergefell2 conflict 
between small businesses and LGBT couples that wish to use those businesses 
for wedding-related services. These businesses may be sole proprietorships, or 
they may involve a business association, such as a partnership, LLC, or 
corporation. To what extent does the entity status of the underlying business 
affect the religious rights of those involved with the business? When can an 
artificial business “person” exercise religious freedom? These questions have 
obviously taken on greater import in the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.,3 which recognized the rights of corporations under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).4 
This essay tackles questions involving the religious exercise rights of 
businesses. Part I discusses the legal problem of determining when a business 
entity has a religious identity sufficient to justify the protection of the entity’s 
rights to free exercise of that religion. After surveying the Supreme Court’s 
approach to this question in Hobby Lobby, and commentators’ responses to this 
approach, I argue that it is not enough to simply consider the religious beliefs 
of those who control the entity, such as shareholders or partners. The 
employees are also an important part of the firm, as recognized by economic 
theory, and we should not ignore the role of employees’ religious beliefs in 
determining the entity’s religious identity. In Part II, I discuss the role of an 
employee’s individual religious beliefs within the scope of employment. 
 
* Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. This paper was presented as 
part of the Symposium on the Saint Louis University Law Journal’s 2015 Childress Lecture 
presented by Larry Sager. My thanks to the Journal editors involved in the Childress Lecture, 
particularly Sara Robertson. And thanks to Elizabeth Pollman, Brett McDonnell, and fellow 
participants at the 2016 National Business Law Scholars Conference for additional thoughts and 
comments. 
 1. Lawrence Sager, In the Name of God: Structural Injustice and Religious Faith, 60 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 585 (2016). 
 2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 4. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012). 
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Traditionally, employees have been afforded legal protections from employer 
discrimination against their own personal faith. However, as we open the door 
to more robust exercise of religious faith by businesses, we must carefully 
consider the ramifications for individual employees within those businesses. 
I.  THE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OF THE FIRM 
It came as a shock to many Americans that a for-profit corporation could 
be considered religious. Similar to the decision in Citizens United v. FEC,5 in 
which the Supreme Court protected the free speech rights of a corporation as a 
“person,” the Hobby Lobby decision was roundly mocked for its holding that a 
business could exercise religious rights.6 Other commentators, however, found 
the liberal outrage over the opinion to be strange, and even “sad,” for reflecting 
a shift from the traditional liberal values of pluralism and tolerance.7 The 
Supreme Court characterized its ultimate decision to protect religious freedom 
as exercised through a corporation as not all that remarkable.8 How do we 
reconcile these competing notions? 
The difficulty for many, I think, is not that an organization could have 
religious exercise rights; the difficulty is specifically with large, for-profit 
business organizations. As Chris Lund has pointed out, United States 
corporations are “deeply secularized,” and it is therefore unusual to think of 
them as entities with a religious identity.9 In fact, corporate law doctrine and 
theory has generally presumed that corporations have but one purpose: 
maximizing returns to their shareholders.10 Although there is debate about the 
 
 5. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Stephen Colbert, Hobby Lobby Case, THE COLBERT REPORT (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/xivy3m/the-colbert-report-hobby-lobby-case [http://perma.cc/NZ 
T6-W5KM] (“Oh, and it’s probably not a big deal, but they also ruled that corporations have 
religious beliefs.”). 
 7. Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 822 
(2015); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat of the Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby Lobby: 
Right Results, Wrong Reasons, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2013–2014, at 35, 68 (“On this score, note 
that my own sympathies on the religion issues lie with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and 
Marshall, not your typical conservative icons. On these issues at least, their civil libertarian views 
aligned with libertarian views more generally.”); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate 
Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 31 (2015) (praising the Court’s opinion for affirming 
that “corporate law authorizes non-profit-maximizing behavior”). 
 8. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (noting that the religious freedom rights of nonprofit 
corporations are uncontroversial). 
 9. Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285, 287 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY]. 
 10. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary 
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the 
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breadth of the shareholder primacy norm and the legal power behind it, it is 
generally regarded as the lodestar for corporate governance.11 Given that the 
secularized pursuit of profit has been embedded by “deeply rooted social 
norms and expectations,”12 the recognition of some other, divinely-inspired 
purpose may seem inapposite. Perhaps as a result, the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) chose to advocate on behalf 
of a bright-line rule: nonprofit corporations would have free-exercise rights 
under the RFRA, while for-profit corporations would not.13 
However, the Hobby Lobby Court was faced with a unique set of for-profit 
corporations who could at least plausibly make a claim to religious identity.14 
Both Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. and Hobby Lobby, Inc. are closely-
held corporations in which all shareholders are members of the same family 
and the same religious community.15 They both have statements of purpose 
and mission that focus on religious values and commitments.16 And they both 
could sincerely claim that the inclusion of certain contraceptive devices and 
drugs were against their religious principles, as they were considered to be 
potential abortifacients.17 Thus, despite the fact that these companies operated 
businesses that were otherwise secular in their products, they had a genuine 
claim that the HHS regulation requiring coverage that provided such 
 
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no 
longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase 
long-term shareholder value.”); Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 17, 33. 
 11. Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the 
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1033–34 (2012) (“Although the vibrancy of 
shareholder primacy has at times been called into question as a matter of law, both boardrooms 
and courts have taken the normative call for shareholder wealth maximization increasingly to 
heart. There is little doubt that the revolution has not only substantially affected legal theory but 
also legislation, court decisions, and corporate behavior.”). 
 12. Lund, supra note 9, at 287. 
 13. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (characterizing the HHS position). 
 14. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out to Paul Clement, the private parties’ counsel, at oral 
argument, “you picked great plaintiffs” in terms of their religious identity. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 19, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-354_3ebh.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/K87C-JV4X]. 
 15. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66. The shareholders of Conestoga Wood are 
Mennonite, while the Hobby Lobby shareholders are Christian. 
 16. See id. at 2765–66 (describing the mission of Conestoga Wood as to “operate in a 
professional environment founded upon the highest ethical, moral, and Christian principles,” and 
the purpose of Hobby Lobby as to “honor[] the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in 
a manner consistent with Biblical principles”). 
 17. Id. 
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contraceptive approaches would infringe upon the exercise of their religious 
freedom. 
The Hobby Lobby Court held that these corporations were able to claim 
RFRA free- exercise rights as religious “persons” under the Act.18 The 
majority rejected the sharp distinction between nonprofit and for-profit 
companies with the notion that for-profit companies could have religious and 
other “nonprofit” motivations, too: 
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to 
make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to 
pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-
profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of 
charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further 
humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. . . . If for-profit corporations may 
pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not 
further religious objectives as well.19 
At the same time, however, the Court recognized that most corporations would 
likely not be able to assert cognizable RFRA claims.20 The Court pointed to 
the unanimity of the litigant companies’ shareholders as to their religious 
beliefs, and noted that “the idea that unrelated shareholders—including 
institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders—would agree to run a 
corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable.”21 By basing 
the corporation’s religious identity primarily on shareholder religious identity, 
the Court seemed to back an associational approach to such identity.22 At the 
same time, however, aspects of the organization’s mission or business 
practices, such as Sunday closures and statements of corporate purpose, were 
also highlighted by the majority.23 And the Court explicitly rejected the notion 
 
 18. Id. at 2768. “For all these reasons, we hold that a federal regulation’s restriction on the 
activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with RFRA.” Id. at 2775. 
 19. Id. at 2771. 
 20. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (“These cases, however, do not involve publicly traded 
corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers will 
often assert RFRA claims.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Elizabeth Sepper, Healthcare Exemptions and the Future of Corporate Religious 
Liberty, in CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 305, 308 (finding that the Court 
“embraced the moral-association theory, which posits that the enterprise functions as an 
association (or aggregate) of individuals”). For a defense of an associational approach, see Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the 
For-Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173, 202 (2015) (“The upshot of this Article’s 
arguments is that corporations are not religious, but corporations may be treated as if they possess 
rights of religious freedom as a way of protecting the religious freedom rights of the corporation’s 
controlling members.”). 
 23. See Sepper, supra note 22, at 307–08 (finding that the Court also “adopted a mission-
operation theory, which finds corporate religion in the mission and politics of the business”). 
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that a corporation could only exercise religious rights on behalf of individual 
shareholders or stakeholders.24 
The alternating focus on the organization and the individual shareholders 
leads to questions about how the Court would handle future inquiries into a 
corporation’s religious identity. Elizabeth Sepper has pointed out the potential 
for confusion: “If a corporation itself is the central rights holder, courts might 
look to a mission statement, articles of incorporation, or policies adopted by 
the board of directors. If, by contrast, corporate religious liberty accords with 
some group of people, other evidence becomes compelling.”25 The Court did 
not resolve this ambiguity, perhaps desiring to leave room for future 
development. In using the Court’s approach to develop a more refined 
standard, Professor Brett McDonnell has created a matrix for determining 
religious identity that looks to both organization and ownership.26 McDonnell 
argues that the organizational dimension on the matrix should be considered 
more important and looks to the organization’s institutional commitment to a 
particular set of religious beliefs and practices.27 Most authoritative, in his 
view, would be a foundational commitment in a corporate charter to a specific 
religious approach.28 Other corporate-law actions, such as bylaws or 
shareholder agreements, would also count, as would actual corporate policies 
and practices that demonstrated the religious identity.29 On the less-important 
ownership side,30 courts would look to the unanimity and sincerity of religious 
 
 24. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (concluding that corporations are protected under 
the RFRA as “persons”); Sepper, supra note 22, at 308 (“The Court did not countenance the 
view . . . that the rights at issue belonged to the individual shareholders and could only be 
ascribed to the corporation through a reverse-veil-piercing analysis.”). 
 25. Sepper, supra note 22, at 308. 
 26. McDonnell, supra note 7, at 796. 
 27. Id. at 800. 
 28. Id. at 796–97; see also Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate 
Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 273, 281 (2014) (“The most obvious vehicle for imposing shareholder views on the 
corporation is the corporate charter.”). 
 29. McDonnell cites as examples policy and value statements, choice of goods or services 
sold that reflect religious values, charitable donations or commitments, religious marketing, and 
formal statements to the public. McDonnell, supra note 7, at 797. 
 30. Although both McDonnell and the Court refer loosely to shareholders as the 
corporation’s owners, commentators have pointed out that shareholders lack many of the indicia 
of what we generally consider to be “ownership.” See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 31 
(“Here and elsewhere in the majority opinion and in the principal dissent, shareholders are 
referred to as the corporation’s ‘owners’ even though there is no legal basis for this oft-used 
reference.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2002) (“A lawyer would know that the shareholders do not, in fact, 
own the corporation.”); Armen A. Alchian & Susan Woodward, The Firm Is Dead; Long Live the 
Firm, 26 J. ECON. LITERATURE 65, 72 (1988) (stating that “ownership of the team is the residual 
claimancy on the most team-specific resources, which may be labor or capital”). But cf. Stout, 
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belief amongst shareholders. Because a belief amongst owners could be subject 
to change with new owners, the ownership factor would favor religious 
identity if there were a relatively small number of shareholders with no active 
market for the shares.31 By cross-referencing both organizational and 
ownership factors, McDonnell argues, a court could develop a more holistic 
sense of the corporation’s ability to exercise religion as an independent entity. 
Both the Hobby Lobby Court’s approach to religious identity and 
McDonnell’s more formalized matrix version of this approach have intuitive 
appeal as a method of determining corporate religious identity. If the 
shareholders individually and the organization as a whole share a commitment 
to a religious tradition or set of beliefs, it seems reasonable to characterize such 
an organization as having a religious identity. Given the existence of other 
business organizational forms that are considered to exercise religion without 
controversy, it is difficult to draw a bright line around the for-profit 
corporation as off-limits for religious expression. Indeed, as both the Court and 
McDonnell point out, it is contrary to progressive principles of corporate law 
to insist that corporations can only be single-minded pursuers of profit at all 
costs.32 And if a for-profit corporation can exercise religion, it makes sense to 
look to both the shareholders and the organization culture to determine when it 
is doing so.33 It is not enough for a set of religiously-minded shareholders to 
impose their religion on an otherwise secular company.34 At the same time, an 
organization with religious orientations but pluralistic shareholders will likely 
not adhere to a particular religious commitment over time.35 
 
supra, at 1191 (“[I]t perhaps is excusable to loosely describe a closely held firm with a single 
controlling shareholder as ‘owned’ by that shareholder . . . .”). 
 31. McDonnell, supra note 7, at 798. 
 32. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) (“[A] for-profit 
corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond 
what the law requires. A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may 
exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits.”); McDonnell, 
supra note 7, at 809 (“But both progressive corporate law and the Hobby Lobby opinion agree in 
seeing corporations as ways for like-minded persons to come together to pursue shared goals to 
advance a shared vision of the common good in ways that go beyond simply complying with the 
law.”). 
 33. For one alternative approach, see Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The 
Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1742 
(2015) (“We are inclined to believe that because no readily available answers exist in corporate or 
constitutional law, the question of who should count toward derivative rights should be analyzed 
pragmatically on a right-by-right basis so as to serve the intended purpose of the right.”). 
 34. Some commentators appear to be more comfortable with shareholder imposition of 
religious values on the corporation. See Meese & Oman, supra note 28, at 279–80 (“Corporations 
whose owners ‘impose their personal religious beliefs’ on the firm are common.”). 
 35. McDonnell paints a picture of such a firm as one that began with religiously-
homogenous shareholders but gradually diversified its ownership through public markets or 
heavy trading with outsiders. McDonnell, supra note 7, at 800. Such a firm would be 
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However, both the Hobby Lobby and McDonnell tests potentially leave out 
a key component of corporate religious identity: namely, the work of the 
corporation’s employees. The corporation’s shareholders are represented 
through the “ownership” dimension, and the board and management control 
the “organizational” dimension in a for-profit corporation.36 But what about 
employees? They are not given an express role in the analysis.37 The Hobby 
Lobby majority does at times seem to recognize the importance of employees 
to the religious identity of a corporation. The Court includes employees in this 
description of corporate law: “An established body of law specifies the rights 
and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) 
who are associated with a corporation in one way or another.”38 It elaborates 
on this point with an example using employees: “For example, extending 
Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of 
employees and others associated with the company.”39 However, when the 
Court ultimately settles on a test, that test seems to exclude employees from 
any role in the analysis. As the majority specifically states: “[P]rotecting the 
free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel 
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those 
companies.”40 Control over religious expression and identity is the prerogative 
of the board of directors and their chosen management team.41 
Moreover, the Court specifically points to corporate law as the process 
through which an organization resolves questions about its religious identity. 
Corporate law provides shareholders with the right to elect the board of 
directors. By exercising this power, shareholders can control the organizational 
 
transitioning from religious identity to secular identity, and it would be a “rarity” for such a firm 
to exist for any length of time. Id. 
 36. While shareholders have voting rights as to the board of directors, most corporate law 
commentators agree that the board exercises control over the corporation through their decisions 
as well as their power to appoint management. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) 
(“Neither shareholders nor managers control corporations––boards of directors do.”). 
 37. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 149, 158 (“[W]hy not also consider the interests of 
employees? Some of the Court’s examples involved protecting employees, yet the Court ignored 
them here despite the issue at stake concerning employee healthcare benefits.”). 
 38. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. Cf. Blair & Pollman, supra note 33, at 1741 (“The Court did not explain why it would 
mention employees when generally referring to derivative rights logic and Fourth Amendment 
protections for corporations, but not when analyzing whether corporations should have religious 
liberty rights to exempt them from employee healthcare benefit regulations.”). 
 41. McDonnell’s analysis concurs as a matter of description, noting that those who “own and 
control” the corporations include shareholders, directors, and officers. McDonnell, supra note 7, 
at 803. 
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policies and culture through official documents, board appointees, and business 
practices. In addressing concerns about disputes over religion creating 
corporate strife, the Court reassures by pointing to these processes: “State 
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for 
example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. . . . 
Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving 
disputes.”42 In discussing whether a publicly-traded corporation could exercise 
RFRA rights, the Court stated: “[T]he idea that unrelated shareholders—
including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders—would 
agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems 
improbable.”43 
The Court’s decision to turn to corporate law on issues of business culture 
is unfortunate. In the United States, corporations are legal entities that are 
created through state corporate law. Power is divided between the 
shareholders, the board of directors, and the officers appointed by the board.44 
The board manages the firm and may bind the corporation through contracts 
and transfers of property.45 Shareholders select the directors at the annual 
shareholders meeting.46 Employees find themselves outside of this governance 
structure. The corporation, acting through officers or other corporate 
representatives, hires them through a contract to be part of the business. This 
contract is most commonly terminable at-will.47 Employees have no direct 
input into the control of the corporation, nor do they have any claim to its 
profits. 
This lack of power directly contravenes the importance of employees 
within the economic conception of the firm. As I have written elsewhere, 
economists such as Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian, and Harold Demsetz have 
long appreciated the importance of the employee to our conception of the 
firm.48 In fact, Coase looked to the relationship between employer and 
employee to demonstrate empirical support for his theory of the firm.49 Under 
long-established agency principles, employees are agents of the firm, and the 
 
 42. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 43. Id. at 2774. 
 44. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21–23 (1986). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 122, 141 (1953). 
 46. Id. § 211. 
 47. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015). 
 48. Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
661, 695 (2013) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) and 
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)). 
 49. Coase, supra note 48, at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a 
firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and servant’ 
or ‘employer and employee.’”). 
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firm is legally responsible for the torts they commit within the scope of 
employment.50 The firm is also legally responsible to its employees through a 
myriad of labor and employment laws.51 When it comes to the actual business 
of the enterprise, employees carry out the business and are the face of the 
business to consumers, suppliers, and other outsiders who interact with the 
firm. While shareholders are legally connected to the corporation while often 
distanced from it in everyday life,52 employees are the opposite—connected to 
their employers in their daily work lives but with no legal power within it. 
Thus, it is not surprising that even though employees are the central 
players within the economic firm, they are treated as third parties in the Hobby 
Lobby litigation. The dispute is between the government and the corporation, 
with the employees’ access to certain kinds of contraception/abortifacients as 
collateral damage. The Court was ultimately not put to the test of allowing 
employees to be denied coverage for these healthcare benefits, as HHS had 
already arranged for an accommodation that required insurers to cover those 
benefits separately, without any connection to the objecting employer.53 The 
Court held that there was “no reason why this accommodation would fail to 
protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraception 
mandate.”54 The Court was thus not forced to choose between contraceptive 
coverage and exercise of religion. Nevertheless, the employees’ interests 
regarding the contraceptive coverage were not characterized as matters for 
resolution within the firm or as part of the overall religious identity of the 
company. Instead, they were third-party interests—interests of people who 
were not otherwise connected with the company’s religious exercise.55 
 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2005). 
 51. Bodie, supra note 48, at 666–68 (discussing protections). 
 52. The separation of shareholder ownership from managerial control forms the basis for 
modern corporate law and theory. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–5 (1932). 
 53. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014). The accommodation 
was originally limited to nonprofit organizations. Id. 
 54. Id. Justice Kennedy, one of the five-member majority, emphasized in a separate 
concurrence: “It is important to confirm that a premise of the Court’s opinion is its assumption 
that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and compelling interest in the health of 
female employees.” Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He specifically asserted that the free 
exercise of religion may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their 
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 2786–87. 
 55. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: 
Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 323, 
323–25 (discussing third parties as “persons who derive no benefit from an exemption because 
they do not believe or engage in the exempted religious practices”). For further explanation of the 
Court’s third-party doctrine, see Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25, 52 (2015) (“A basic principle holds that governments may 
voluntarily lift regulatory burdens from religious actors, but not if accommodating them shifts 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
618 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:609 
Employees should not be treated as third parties when it comes to the 
exercise of the corporation’s religious beliefs. The employees’ beliefs and 
practices are part of the corporation’s religious identity. From an 
organizational perspective, employees are an important part of the firm—
perhaps its most important set of participants.56 Determining a corporation’s 
religious identity without looking to employees distorts the true picture of 
religion’s role in that organization’s life. Perhaps more importantly, the 
corporation’s exercise of its identity is likely to have a large impact on 
employees, as they will generally be tasked with carrying out the exercise or, 
as in Hobby Lobby, will be directly impacted by it. If employees are not 
integral to the creation of such an identity, they would simply be pawns, mere 
instrumentalities of the firm’s owners and controllers, in the exercise of a 
foreign religious identity. 
The controversy surrounding donations by shareholders of Chick-fil-A 
illustrates the concerns. In 2011, the restaurant chain became embroiled in 
controversy concerning the same-sex marriage debate. The company itself co-
sponsored a marriage seminar by an outspoken advocacy group that opposed 
gay rights and same-sex marriage.57 Further financial support was provided to 
anti-gay-marriage groups by the company’s shareholders, who, like Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga Wood, were family members who owned the entire 
business through a closely-held corporation.58 As a result, the company soon 
took on a cultural, religious, and political identity: that of a Christian, anti-gay 
company.59 Both supporters and critics imbued the company’s chicken 
sandwiches with a thick layer of symbolic meaning. And employees—
particularly gay employees—were caught in the middle: 
One gay employee who works at Chick-fil-A headquarters in Atlanta, Ga., and 
asked to remain anonymous for fear of losing his job, says he is getting it from 
both sides. On the one hand, there is the customer who came in and said he 
 
burdens onto third parties. Driving that rule is the normative principle that shifting burdens in this 
way would improperly impose the faith of one private party on another, in violation of the 
government’s obligation of evenhandedness in the face of religious differences among citizens.”). 
 56. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 1–12 (1977) (discussing the 
role of middle- and upper-managerial employees in coordinating large firms). 
 57. Kim Severson, A Chicken Chain’s Corporate Ethos Is Questioned by Gay Rights 
Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/us/30 
chick.html [http://perma.cc/CKA9-EXBL]. 
 58. Kim Severson, Chick-fil-A Thrust Back Into Spotlight on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 
25, 2012, at A13, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/us/gay-rights-uproar-over-chick-fil-a-
widens.html [http://perma.cc/BC6Y-P6JH] (stating that “the company’s operators, its [charitable] 
WinShape Foundation and the Cathy family had given millions of dollars to groups whose work 
includes defeating same-sex marriage initiatives and providing therapy intended to change 
people’s sexual orientation”). 
 59. Id. (noting that one group planned an LGBT “kiss-in” at Chick-fil-A restaurants, while 
former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee declared a “Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day”). 
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supported Dan Cathy and then “continues to say something truly homophobic, 
e.g. ‘I’m so glad you don’t support the queers, I can eat in peace,’” the 
employee, who is 23 and has worked for Chick-fil-A since he was 16, wrote in 
an email. On the other hand, he continued, “I was yelled at for being a god-
loving, conservative, homophobic Christian while walking some food out to a 
guest in a mall dining room.”60 
Because employees are the face of an organization, particularly in retail and 
service establishments, they must assume the mantle of the religious (or 
political or cultural) identity of the corporation when on the job. The religious 
identity becomes theirs, at least when working. 
Similarly, the Hobby Lobby litigation shows how protecting a 
corporation’s religious identity can impinge upon the terms and conditions of 
employment. As noted earlier, the controversy did not really threaten to 
deprive employees of contraceptive coverage, as HHS had already developed 
an accommodation that protected religious liberty while providing coverage.61 
However, the outrage generated by the case stemmed at least in part from the 
notion that a company’s shareholders and management could dictate to 
employees the types of contraception they could use.62 Rather than simply an 
accommodation of one sincere religious belief, the case came across as one 
(powerful) group trying to impose its religious beliefs on another (less 
powerful) group. As this played out in the Hobby Lobby case, the five 
members of the Green family used their religious beliefs to defeat a regulatory 
obligation to the 13,000-plus employees at the company.63 Some 
commentators argued that allowing Hobby Lobby shareholders to use the 
RFRA to dictate contraception coverage for their employees would violate the 
Establishment Clause, as it would allow the shareholders to establish their 
religious beliefs over employees through the help of the government.64 But 
 
 60. Lila Shapiro, Chick-fil-A Anti-Gay Controversy: Gay Employees Speak Out, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/01/chick-fil-a-anti-
gay-controversy-employees-speak-out_n_1729968.html [http://perma.cc/ZX4A-MUER]. 
 61. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014). 
 62. See, e.g., Jake Lefferman, Dems Strike Back on Hobby Lobby Case With ‘Not My Boss’s 
Business Act,’ ABCNews.com (July 9, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/07/ 
dems-strike-back-on-hobby-lobby-case-with-not-my-bosss-business-act/ [http://perma.cc/3CQ2-
BV5Q] (“Colorado’s [Senator Mark] Udall said women should never have to ask their bosses for 
a ‘permission slip’ to access birth control or other critical health services.”); Supreme Court Rules 
in Favor of Hobby Lobby in Birth-Control Mandate Case, CHI. TRIB. (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-supreme-court-birth-control-mandate-20140630-stor 
y.html [http://perma.cc/9FNW-JXV2] (“Some demonstrators chanted, ‘Keep your boardroom out 
of my bedroom’ and ‘Separate church and state, women must decide their fate.’”). 
 63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
 64. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 343, 349 (2014) (“Courts and commentators seem unaware that by shifting the material 
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regardless of the constitutional ramifications, exalting the shareholders’ 
religious beliefs ignores the obvious possible conflicts with the employees’ 
religious beliefs. 
Corporations should only have the right to exercise their religion if the 
organization as a whole has a religious identity. It cannot simply be based on 
shareholders’ beliefs. Instead, a more holistic perspective on the organization’s 
identity, presented both internally and to the outside world, is critical. The 
most important factor is the ongoing business itself: does the corporation’s 
business reflect the alleged religious identity? The nature of the ongoing 
enterprise is what makes cases involving churches and religious nonprofits to 
be easily seen as having religious rights, and cases like Hobby Lobby to be 
seen as problematic. The very “business” of the Catholic Church or the 
University of Notre Dame is religious in nature. Most for-profit enterprises, 
however, will not have an overtly religious business enterprise.65 On this score, 
Hobby Lobby makes out a thin case. Its underlying industry—the sales of arts 
and crafts products—is not overtly religious in nature. Hobby Lobby is also not 
terribly religious in its sales, marketing, or branding, although the store does 
allegedly refuse to promote alcohol use, and its stores are closed on Sunday.66 
On the other hand, Mardel—a Christian bookseller operated as a for-profit 
entity by one of the Greens—seems inherently religious in its business.67 
The religious identity of the corporation will impact employees in the ways 
in which they carry out their job responsibilities. The relative investment that 
the employee must make in the business’s religious identity will depend on the 
 
costs of accommodating anticontraception beliefs from the employers who hold them to their 
employees who do not, RFRA exemptions from the Mandate violate an Establishment Clause 
constraint on permissive accommodation.”); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare 
and Religion and Arguing off the Wall, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/obamacare_birth_control_mandate_lawsuit_how_a_rad
ical_argument_went_mainstream.html [http://perma.cc/YZ5M-LM5Z] (noting Establishment 
Clause concerns with imposing religious beliefs on employees). 
 65. See, e.g., Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to 
Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2013) (“For instance, from a functional viewpoint, the 
need to give these types of corporations the right to exercise religion would be difficult to 
rationalize, although there is a possibility that certain entities could make a convincing case that 
adherence to religious beliefs or practices is in fact an essential part of their business.”); Usha 
Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1264 (2011) (“A for-profit entity that 
proposes to save the dolphins or feed the hungry is incoherent because the knowledge that the 
firm’s owner is ultimately in business to make money will dim the self-same warm glow that a 
donor seeks in giving to the organization in the first place.”). 
 66. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. Other sources have noted additional components of 
Hobby Lobby’s religious identity, including that it plays Christian music in its stores and 
provides employees with free access to chaplains, spiritual counseling, and religiously themed 
financial advice. Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for 
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 77–78 (2013). 
 67. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
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nature of the business and the employee’s role within the business. A retail 
employee at a Christian bookstore will be engaged in selling Christian books, 
and thus will need to be knowledgeable about such books, or at the least 
respectful towards them, while a maintenance employee would not really have 
any direct engagement with consumers, sales, or the underlying nature of the 
business. Regardless, however, these employees have made a choice to work 
for a religiously-oriented business. They are on notice that the business might 
call upon them to act in the corporation’s religious interests—that the 
corporation exercises its religious rights. We can then expect employee 
expectations to reflect an understanding of the nature of the enterprise. Such a 
situation does not represent a cadre of owner-shareholders imposing their 
beliefs on a set of disempowered workers. It is the shareholders and employees 
participating together in a religiously-oriented business enterprise.68 
The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby does not adequately reflect the 
importance of the religious identity of the underlying business. Yes, the Court 
does cite to the fact that Hobby Lobby’s family members have signed a 
“pledge” to “run the business in accordance with the family’s religious 
beliefs.”69However, aside from the aforementioned Sunday closure and anti-
alcohol stances, there is little about the religious nature of the underlying 
business. As far as Conestoga Wood goes, the Court cites to literally nothing 
about the underlying business that is religious in nature. The only religious act 
of the corporation mentioned in the opinion is its opposition to funding 
abortifacients.70 Both Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby had mission 
statements or other internal documents that reflected their Christian heritage,71 
but such pieces of paper should not be accorded much value if not put into 
action. McDonnell, too, places too much importance on corporate charters and 
bylaws in determining the organization’s religious commitment. He argues that 
a corporate charter provision related to religious identity would be “[t]he most 
 
 68. Cf. Bodie, supra note 48, at 705 (“It is not that employees are controlled by the firm that 
makes them employees. It is rather that they are part of a process of joint production, acting 
together within one unit.”). See also McDonnell, supra note 7, at 809 (“But both progressive 
corporate law and the Hobby Lobby opinion agree in seeing corporations as ways for like-minded 
persons to come together to pursue shared goals to advance a shared vision of the common good 
in ways that go beyond simply complying with the law.”). 
 69. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 70. Id. at 2765. 
 71. Id. at 2764–66. Conestoga Wood adopted its statement on the sanctity of human life in 
October 2012, likely in anticipation of the ACA litigation. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and 
remanded to sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 
(2014) and rev’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 13-1144, 2014 WL 4467879 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2014). 
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authoritative rule” and potentially “controlling.”72 McDonnell does recognize 
that there is a “rich array of possibilities” for demonstrating an organizational 
religious commitment, including marketing, choice of goods or services, and 
contractual commitments.73 And he also states that “[w]e should be able to find 
some degree of religious commitment along the organizational dimension if we 
are to grant RFRA standing.”74 However, he qualifies this by stating that “the 
degree of commitment can certainly be more modest where the ownership 
dimension shows a strong commitment.”75 And he ultimately concludes that 
“the majority decision in Hobby Lobby fits well with the framework for 
determining RFRA standing elaborated here, which in turn fits well with the 
prevailing progressive conception of the corporation.”76 
The Hobby Lobby decision, and McDonnell’s doctrinal formulation of that 
decision’s approach, both treat employees too much like outsiders to the 
corporation’s religious identity.77 Employees are part of that identity. They 
need not share the religious identity personally, but they can be expected to 
share that identity within the scope of their employment. Just as we expect 
employees of the St. Louis Cardinals to be fans of the team and of baseball 
while on the job, and employees of Nike to share some commitment to 
athletics, we can expect employees of a religious corporation to participate in 
the company’s religious identity. The Court itself recognizes this when it notes 
that a corporation concerns “the rights and obligations of the people (including 
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation 
in one way or another,” and that corporations “cannot do anything at all” 
without “the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them.”78 The 
specific holding in Hobby Lobby, however, threatens to allow a small set of 
shareholders to leverage their personal religious beliefs over a large set of 
employees in a business that otherwise has no demonstrable religious 
attachments. Such a reading improperly privileges the personal religious 
 
 72. McDonnell, supra note 7, at 796–97. 
 73. Id. at 797. 
 74. Id. at 801 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 806–07 (“In determining what the 
purposes of an organization are, we do not simply add up the individual preferences of those 
human beings involved in the organization; we look to the defining rules of the organization to 
ask what its purposes are, and who has the authority to define them.”). 
 75. Id. at 801. 
 76. Id. at 808. 
 77. McDonnell’s approach is likely a reflection of current corporate law doctrine, as he has 
previously and powerfully advocated for greater employee inclusion in corporate governance. See 
Brett McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (arguing for employee primacy in corporate decision-
making); Brett McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 429 (2011) (evaluating possible strategies for creating a role for employees in 
corporate governance). 
 78. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] FAITH AND THE FIRM 623 
commitments of one group over another, and does damage to the implicit 
expectations of the participants within the firm. 
Of course, the stronger the institutional commitment to religion, the more 
pressure will be put on individual employees to adhere to that commitment in 
their work lives. What is the role of the individual employee’s personal 
religious identity within an overtly religious corporation? And what is the 
power of the firm to demand that the employee professionally, or even 
personally, share in the business’s religious commitments? These questions are 
taken up below. 
II.  EMPLOYEE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY WITHIN THE (RELIGIOUS) FIRM 
In a nonreligious for-profit company, the issue of an employee’s religion is 
traditionally deemed to be irrelevant to the performance of their job duties. 
Like other personal characteristics, beliefs, or memberships, religion is 
protected by federal statute against employer discrimination.79 A company is 
even required to accommodate the employee’s religion if it can be done 
without undue hardship.80 However, Title VII specifically excludes an 
employer that is “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, 
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”81 Entities that 
do not meet the religious entity requirement can use religion to discriminate 
only if they can show that religion is a bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ).82 
Title VII’s treatment of an employee’s religion dovetails with our 
discussion above in Part I about corporate religious identity. Under Title VII, 
the corporation is only entitled to exercise its religious beliefs to discriminate 
against employees when it is “a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society,” and when that employee is asked to “perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society of its activities.”83 In determining whether a particular 
business entity is sufficiently religious, courts have looked to the entity’s 
 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (making it unlawful to discriminate in employment based on 
religion or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of religion). 
 80. Title VII states: “The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j). 
 81. Id. § 2000e-1. 
 82. See, e.g., Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 83. Id. § 2000e-1. 
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underlying business.84 In EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing 
Co.,85 a closely-held mining equipment manufacturer sought to be covered 
under the “religious corporation” exemption when it was sued by an employee 
who was fired after claiming to be an atheist.86 The company’s founders (and 
ninety-four percent share owners) intended their business to be “a Christian, 
faith-operated business” and reflected that faith in numerous ways, such as 
printing Biblical verses on invoices and requiring employees to attend a 
devotional service.87 But the company was otherwise a straightforward mining 
equipment manufacturer. The court stated: 
  When viewed together, we have no difficulty in holding that these 
characteristics indicate that Townley is primarily secular. We do not question 
the sincerity of the religious beliefs of the owners of Townley. Nor do we 
question that they regard the conduct of their company as subject to a compact 
with God. We merely hold that the beliefs of the owners and operators of a 
corporation are simply not enough in themselves to make the corporation 
“religious” within the meaning of section 702.88 
The court went on to hold that the company’s refusal to excuse the employee 
from religious services was unlawful discrimination under Title VII.89 
Similarly, in Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home,90 a home for orphans 
and abandoned children was held not to be religious, even though it was 
founded and controlled by the Methodist Church. 
  While the original mission of the United Methodist Children’s Home may 
have been to provide a Christian home for orphans and other children, that 
mission has not remained unchanged. The facts show that as far as the 
direction given the day-to-day life for the children at the Home is concerned, it 
is practically devoid of religious content or training, as such. While the 
 
 84. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Over the years, courts have looked at the following factors: (1) whether the entity operates for a 
profit, (2) whether it produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation 
or other pertinent documents state a religious purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with or 
financially supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or synagogue, (5) whether a 
formally religious entity participates in the management, for instance by having representatives 
on the board of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds itself out to the public as secular or sectarian, 
(7) whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its activities, (8) 
whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the extent it is an educational 
institution, and (9) whether its membership is made up by coreligionists.”). 
 85. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 86. Id. at 611–12. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 619. But see id. at 625 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court’s 
characterization of the corporation’s purpose as secular is itself an improper theological 
judgment). 
 89. Id. at 616. 
 90. 547 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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purpose of caring for and providing guidance for troubled youths is no doubt 
an admirable and charitable one, it is not necessarily a religious one. For an 
organization to be considered “religious” requires something more than a 
board of trustees who are members of a church.91 
At the same time, it has been relatively uncontroversial when a truly 
religiously-oriented institution, like a church or religious school, seeks to fill 
its employee ranks with those who adhere to the same faith.92 The difference is 
that the activity or “business” of the institution for which the employee was 
hired must be religious in nature. 
Courts have gone on to grant religious organizations even broader 
employment freedoms from federal antidiscrimination protections. In 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,93 the 
Supreme Court provided a defense for religious groups against employment 
discrimination claims brought by ministers. The Court acknowledged a 
protected zone around a religious group’s ministerial decisions out of a 
concern with “government interference with an internal church decision that 
affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”94 A ministerial exception 
seemed inapposite, in some respects, in the case at hand, because the plaintiff 
claimed she was fired because of her narcolepsy and subsequent disability 
leave—not for any religiously-oriented reason.95 But the Court stated: “The 
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a 
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead 
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the 
faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church’s alone.”96 Within the 
Court’s unanimous decision, the primary ground for controversy seemed to be 
 
 91. Id. at 290. 
 92. Townley, 859 F.2d at 618 (citing the following examples in which the institution was 
found to be religious under § 702: “EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (defendant was ‘private educational institution . . . wholly owned and operated by the 
Assembly of God church’); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (defendant was ‘nonprofit corporation . . . affiliated with the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church’ engaged in publishing ‘religiously oriented material’); Rayburn v. General Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1164–65 (4th Cir. 1985) (defendant was church); EEOC 
v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 478 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant was college owned and 
operated by convention of Southern Baptist churches)”); see also LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish 
Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 231 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding a Jewish community center to be a § 
702 religious organization because its main purpose was “to enhance and promote Jewish life, 
identity, and continuity, not to teach calculus or chemistry”). 
 93. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 94. Id. at 707. 
 95. Id. at 700. 
 96. Id. at 709 (citation and quotations omitted). 
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the definition of minister, as two concurrences offered alternatives at either 
ends of the spectrum.97 
These examples demonstrate that within a broad commitment to defend 
against religious discrimination, courts and legislatures are willing to provide 
employers with a fair amount of flexibility in circumstances where the 
organization has a religious identity and the employee is important to that 
identity. This perspective has applications to corporations beyond just religion. 
The more important a particular cultural component is to the overall business, 
the more employees can be expected to participate in that component. This is, 
in many ways, common sense. But if for-profit corporations begin to take on 
deeper religious, political, or other cultural identities, then this may unsettle the 
existing assumption that employees are largely free to make their own choices 
on such matters. 
Larry Sager has defended this freedom over employment or membership 
choices, both within religious contexts as well as political or social groups, on 
associational grounds.98 Arguing against special solicitude toward religion, 
Sager contends that the ministerial exception is justified by the application of a 
right to close associations that consists of two parts: a dyadic relationship 
between a religious leader and his or her congregants, and a broader 
relationship between all the members of a particular church or group in 
choosing a leader.99 These broader associational rights are critical to all groups 
(including the titular fishing club), based on the associational needs of people 
to form groups without government interference.100 Of course, Sager does not 
argue for such rights to be generally applied to employers. But it is not a 
 
 97. Justice Thomas would require courts to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith 
understanding of who qualifies as a minister. Id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Alito, on 
the other hand, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kagan, would limit the exception only to 
an employee who “leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important 
religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.” Id. at 712 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 98. Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water 
Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 77. 
 99. Id. at 86–87. 
 100. See id. at 88 (arguing that close association groups are “entitled to be free from 
antidiscrimination laws with regard to their choice of members” and “entitled to discriminate in 
the choice of their leaders”). 
Although critical of the ministerial exemption, Caroline Mala Corbin acknowledged the potential 
that such an exception may be justified on expressive-association grounds. Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2029 (2007). However, she contended that it would only be justified 
to the extent that the alleged discrimination was required by the religion. Id. (“[T]his right will 
not exempt all religious organizations from Title VII, only those that espouse discrimination.”). 
She also noted that the right could be overcome by “a compelling state interest in eliminating sex 
and race discrimination in paid employment.” Id. 
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stretch to argue that the stronger a corporation’s internal commitment to a 
religious, philosophical, political, or cultural mission, the more such a 
corporation is differentiating itself based on that mission from the general 
norms of commerce. And such a corporation could ask more of its employees, 
both in terms of a commitment to that mission as well as exceptions to certain 
generally applicable employment regulations. 
To take an example outside of the religious context, consider the case of 
the Feminist Women’s Health Center.101 In that case, an employee was fired 
for refusing to perform a cervical self-examination in front of a small group of 
women as part of a Center self-help group.102 The employee claimed that 
requiring her to disrobe and perform such a procedure in front of others 
violated her rights to privacy under the California Constitution.103 Noting the 
seriousness of the privacy invasion, the court nevertheless found the self-
examination procedure to be a reasonable job requirement based on the 
mission of the Center. The Center’s leaders believed that “cervical self-
examination is important in advancing the Center’s fundamental goal of 
educating women about the function and health of their reproductive 
systems.”104 Upon hiring, the employee was informed of the procedure and 
signed a form indicating a willingness to perform it.105 As the court 
recognized, the self-examination very likely conflicted with the employee’s 
own individual religious and cultural background and perspective.106 
Nevertheless, because of the Center’s commitment to its interpretation of a 
feminist approach to women’s health,107 it was entitled to demand an 
incredibly intrusive invasion of privacy of its employees. 
How far can organizations push this? For-profit corporations already have 
strong pressures to promote their brands through their employees, particularly 
in the service and retail sectors.108 When corporations include the fire of 
 
 101. See Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1234 (1997). 
 102. Id. at 1238. 
 103. Id. at 1244–45. 
 104. Id. at 1248. 
 105. Id. at 1249. 
 106. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1249. 
 107. Id. at 1239. The Center’s executive director provided a declaration regarding the 
Center’s policies and practices which included the following: “The goal of self-help is to 
demystify and redefine the normal functions of a woman’s body. Our unique and effective, 
although not strictly necessary tool to accomplish this is for women to visualize their own 
cervixes and vaginas, which are not usually seen with the naked eye without the use of a vaginal 
speculum.” Id. 
 108. See Dallan F. Flake, Image Is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious 
Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 701 (2015) (“There exists an inherent 
tension in the law—played out daily in workplaces across the United States—between an 
employee’s right to religious expression and an employer’s countervailing right to cultivate the 
corporate image of its choosing.”). 
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religious zeal to their corporate mission or purpose, they are bound to seek to 
conform to God’s laws, not man’s. Under the ministerial exemption, religious 
groups may seek broader exemptions from general societal responsibilities 
beyond antidiscrimination statutes. The Supreme Court explicitly left this open 
in Hosanna-Tabor.109 But the logic behind the ministerial exemption will lead 
to pressure to expand it to religiously-oriented institutions, including for-profit 
corporations.110 Given the recent expansion of constitutional and statutory 
protections for sexual orientation, there are bound to be more conflicts when 
such societal protections conflict with many mainstream religious groups.111 
Of course, none of this is to say that most employers now have open 
season to declare a particular religious, political, or cultural commitment and 
thereby dodge societal responsibilities that are placed on employers. The 
Restatement of Employment Law recently acknowledged a default 
presumption that employees should not be fired based on their personal 
autonomy interests, such as religion, politics, and recreational activities, so 
long as these do not interfere with the employer’s legitimate business 
interests.112 And individual managers and supervisors should not be allowed to 
leverage their power over employees to advance their personal religious 
commitments.113 But Hobby Lobby has opened up a new perspective on the 
religious identities of for-profit corporations. And such identities, if evidenced 
in the nature of the business itself, do provide a justification for a stronger 
commitment from the employees who conduct that business.114 Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby expressed concern that the RFRA could be 
 
 109. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012) (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions 
by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There 
will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and 
when they arise.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 291 P.3d 1231, 1234 
(Mont. 2012) (Hutterische Church community argued that it should be exempt from workers’ 
compensation requirements because of church requirements that the church take care of its own 
and provide health care to all members). For a discussion of this case and others, see Zoë 
Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor after Hobby Lobby, in CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, 
at 173, 187–90. 
 111. See Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 231, 242–44 (discussing the potential for conflict over the 
issue). 
 112. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08 (2015). 
 113. See, e.g., Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) (allowing Title VII 
claim to proceed on the theory that employee was denied a promotion because her supervisor 
chose another employee who shared his religion). 
 114. Cf. Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association, 85 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2012) (proposing that corporations with specific communities and cultures akin to de 
Tocqueville’s “associations” should receive greater protections in terms of political speech than 
other types of corporations). 
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interpreted to protect employers in discriminating against employees based on 
religion, sexual orientation, or even race.115 Controversies such as these loom 
on the horizon of our new, post-Hobby Lobby world. 
CONCLUSION 
Tectonic societal shifts have led to new conflicts over ideological and 
religious principles. Many of these conflicts can play out in workplace 
disputes. The Hobby Lobby decision opened up the potential for corporate 
entities to form a religious identity and exercise religious rights that may 
impact employees and third parties. This essay counsels that this religious 
identity should be based on corporate culture, including employees and the 
business they conduct, rather than the private religious beliefs of some portion 
of the company’s shareholders. Allowing for a corporate religious identity can 
create “legal, practical, and ideological space” for corporations to “pursue a 
variety of social values while still looking to make some money.”116 However, 
we must be careful that such identities do not become tools for the legal 
owners of the corporation to impose their personal beliefs in the absence of a 
concomitant organizational commitment to those beliefs. 
  
 
 115. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2804–05 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). The majority rejected this interpretation of its opinion as to racial discrimination. Id. 
at 2783 (“The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on 
the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. Our decision 
today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial 
discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”). Commentators disagree over 
the extent to which the post-Hobby Lobby RFRA trumps Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
provisions. Compare Hanna Martin, Note, Race, Religion, and RFRA: The Implications of 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. in Employment Discrimination, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. 
DENOVO 1, 3 (2016) (“This Note argues that an employer who wishes to discriminate in hiring 
based on race—despite contrary federal law—can easily state a claim under the federal or a state 
RFRA.”), with Cristina Squiers, Comment, Employment Law—Hobby Lobby’s Narrow Holding 
Guards Against Discrimination, 68 SMU L. REV. 307 (2015) (“While the dissent believes the 
majority’s decision will result in employers cloaking their discriminatory practices under the 
façade of religious exercise, this fear is unfounded because it is based on a misunderstanding of 
the Court’s narrow holding.”). One federal district court recently held that RFRA does in fact 
exempt an employer from Title VII’s prohibitions based on the employer’s religious beliefs. 
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 14-13710, 2016 WL 4396083, at *22 
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2016) (“[T]he Funeral Home is entitled to a RFRA exemption from Title 
VII, and the body of sex-stereotyping case law that has developed under it, under the facts and 
circumstances of this unique case.”). 
 116. McDonnell, supra note 7, at 822. 
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